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BOOK REVIEWS 
Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles, by John Earman. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi and 217. $39.95 (cloth), 
$21.95 (paper). 
ROBERT SLOAN LEE, Wayne State University 
Just like many other communities, it can be difficult to disabuse the philo-
sophical community of some of its long-held beliefs. One such belief is that 
Hume proved, in "Of Miracles" (Chapter X of Hume's Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding), that testimonial evidence cannot substantiate belief 
in miracles. Many philosophers hold that Hume's argument constitutes an 
original and decisive blow against the defender of miracles. However, 
John Earman - who is no advocate of Christian theism - has set out to dis-
abuse the philosophical community of this belief. Here, he summarizes his 
own damning critique of Hume: 
So to be blunt, I contend that "Of Miracles" is an abject failure. It is 
not simply that Hume's essay does not achieve its goals, but that his 
goals are ambiguous and confused. Most of Hume's considerations 
are unoriginal, warmed over versions of arguments that are found in 
the writings of predecessors and contemporaries. And the parts of 
"Of Miracles" that set Hume apart do not stand up to scrutiny .... 
And to cap it all off, the essay represents the kind of overreaching 
that gives philosophy a bad name. (p.3) 
These are strong words, but by the end of the book there is little doubt that 
the charges are well founded. The book is divided into two parts: 
Earman's own treatment of Hume's argument and an anthology of eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth century selections bearing on the argument. 
Each part will be discussed in tum. 
The first part of the book (a mere seventy pages) provides Earman's 
support for his charge of abject failure. The first seven chapters cover 
Hume's own religious orientation, explore the origins of Hume's essay in 
its historical context, and discuss the concept of miracle itself. Chapter 
Eight outlines the struchlre of Hume's essay, and the remaining chapters 
deal primarily with considerations of probability as applied to Hume's 
argument, position, and aims. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 20 No.3 July 2003 
All rights reserved 
379 
380 Faith and Philosophy 
One axis of Earman's critique focuses on Hume's straight rule of induc-
tion. According to the straight rule of induction, "if n As have been exam-
ined, all of which were found to be Bs, then if n is sufficiently large, the 
probability that all As are Bs is I" (pp. 22-23). For example, when we have 
seen enough dead men stay dead, we can infer the presumptive law of 
nature - namely, that all dead men stay dead - is certain. Upon this 
straight rule of induction, Hume crafts his first argument against miracles: 
A (Hume) miracle is a violation of a presumptive law of nature. By 
Hume's straight rule of induction, experience confers a probability of 
1 on a presumptive law. Hence, the probability of a miracle is flatly 
zero. Very simple. And very crude. This "proof" works not only 
against resurrections but against, say, the "miracle" of a violation of 
the presumptive law of conservation of energy. Little wonder then 
that those of Hume's contemporaries who had a less crude view of 
how induction works found no merit in Hume's "proof." (pp. 23-24) 
Earman goes on to show how adopting the straight rule of induction, in 
addition to forcing the conclusion Hume wanted about miracles, also 
forces Hume into other intractable difficulties. First, it ends up stultifying 
scientific inquiry - and Earman explains why dropping (or weakening) the 
straight rule deflates Hume's argument against miracles (Chapter 
Thirteen). Second, Hume's straight rule of induction faces obvious coun-
terexamples, such as the story of the Indian prince who, because he lived in 
a warm climate, refused to believe reports that water can become a solid 
(Chapter Fourteen). Earman goes on to explain why modifications of the 
straight rule of induction are useless in overcoming this counterexample 
and why Hume's discussion of it is largely "an attempt to muddy the 
waters of the Indian prince" (p. 34). 
In contrast to Hume's straight rule of induction, Earman discusses 
Laplace's rule of succession which is endorsed by Hume's contemporary, 
Richard Price (Chapter Twelve). Laplace's rule of succession avoids the dif-
ficulties of Hume's straight rule. According to Laplace's rule, the probabili-
ty that a future number, r, of trials of As will show that they are Bs (given 
one's background knowledge and given that a number, n, of previous trials 
of As yield the result that they were Bs) is determined by adding 1 to n and 
then dividing that sum by itself plus the number of future trials, r. Of 
course, Earman states all of this, and much else besides, with the probability 
calculus. Using "H(r)" to represent the hypothesis that the next number of 
trials of As will turn out to be Bs, using "K" for one background knowledge, 
and using "E(n,n)" to represent the number of past A's that have turned out 
to be B's, Earman states Laplace's rule of succession as follows: 
Pr(H(r)/E (n,n) &K) = n + 1 . 
n+r+l 
This formalized statement of Laplace's rule provides a taste of the probability 
nomenclature that fills most of the chapters handling issues of probability. As 
a result, the audience capable of distilling the full value of Earman's book will 
be restricted to those who have some facility with the probability calculus. 
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While Earman thinks that Hume's essay is ambiguous enough to ascribe 
the straight rule of induction to Hume, Earman thinks that part two of 
Hume's essay is superfluous under this reading (pp. 21-22). So, other chap-
ters (some of them heavily laden with probability notation) discuss issues 
that come to the foreground when one lays aside Hume's straight rule. 
These issues include Hume's maxim (viz., that one should believe testimo-
ny only when the probability of the testimony exceeds the probability of the 
event attested to), Hume's diminution principle (viz., that the degree of con-
firmation that testimony provides to an event is inversely proportional to 
the unusualness of that event), the status of testimony-based multiple wit-
nessing to an event, and the question of whether miracle reports can con-
firm religious doctrine. On this last issue, Earman concludes: 
I do not presume to know how these issues are to be resolved. I insist 
only that, first, they are paralleled by similar issues in the assessment 
of how, say, low probability events in a cloud chamber serve to prob-
abilify theoretical hypotheses in elementary particle physics and, sec-
ond, that there are no in principle obstacles to a positive outcome in 
either science or religion. (p. 67) 
Only those who have a great deal of facility in the probability calculus will 
find these chapters fluid reading. 
Not all of the topics discussed by Earman can be covered here, but one 
chapter deserves closer attention before reviewing the anthology included 
in Earman's book. Chapter Sixteen attempts to ascertain Hume's goals in 
the light of the second part of Hume's essay. Earman argues that Hume 
vacillates between three different theses, which Earman takes as a mark of 
"Hume's uncertainty about what he wanted to prove and also of his (per-
haps unconscious) doubts about what his arguments establish" (p. 44). 
The weak thesis is that, given susceptibility to deception, passion and other 
deleterious influences one must exercise caution in evaluating claims to the 
miraculous. The problem with this thesis is that it is merely a platitude -
and a platitude that was already articulated and endorsed by Hume's con-
temporary opponents (p. 44). The strong thesis is that no testimony can 
ever prove or even make plausible - the occurrence of a miracle. Of 
course, Earman explains (earlier in the book) how this absurdly strong the-
sis leads to intractable difficulties. The middle thesis is that in no particular 
recorded case is the testimonial evidence strong enough to establish the 
credibility of the miracle in question. Earman points out that the difficulty 
with this thesis is that Hume makes no genuine attempt to give "a detailed 
presentation of all the circumstances and all the evidence, eyewitness and 
otherwise" of any particular miracle report (p. 45). Earman observes that 
Hume simply fails to enter into the debates of his contemporaries. In par-
ticular, Hume avoids discussing the details of the resurrection of Jesus 
which served as a much discussed focal point in the eighteenth century 
debate on miracles. Earman concludes this chapter with the challenge: 
"Commentators who wish to credit Hume with some deep insight must 
point to some thesis which is both philosophically interesting and which 
Hume has made plausible" (p. 48). Indicating his pessimism with respect 
382 Faith and Philosophy 
to meeting this challenge, Earman says, "Hume has generated the illusion 
of deep insight by sliding back and forth between various theses, no one of 
which avoids both the Scylla of banality and the Charybdis of implausibili-
ty or outright falsehood" (p. 48). 
The second part of the book is an anthology including Hume's own 
essay along with other selections from primary texts pertaining to Hume's 
argument. These selections are drawn from the work of John Locke, 
Benedict de Spinoza, Samuel Clark, Thomas Sherlock, Peter Annet, Richard 
Price, George Campbell, Pierre Laplace, Charles Babbage, and one anony-
mous selection (perhaps by George Hooper). Of special interest are the 
very hard to find essays of Thomas Sherlock, "The Tryal of the Witnesses of 
the Resurrection of Jesus" (1729), and Peter Annet, "The Resurrection of 
Jesus Considered: In Answer to the Tryal of the Witnesses" (1744). These 
selections were so interesting that it is disappointing that the entire essays 
could not be included. Richard Price's reply to Hume is so substantial that 
one wonders how most philosophers ever got the general impression that 
Hume dealt a devastating blow to miracle reports. It seems that Price's 
work even caused Hume to second-guess himself (pp. viii, 24, and 45). 
Anyone familiar with the current debate surrounding the concept and evi-
dential status of miracles may be surprised to see how much of the current 
debate simply reiterates the debate of the eighteenth century. 
Despite the inclusion of an appendix intended to serve as a primer for 
the probability calculus, this is not a book for the beginner. The appendix 
is much too brief and awkward to serve a genuine primer to the newcom-
er. There are a few minor typos, and almost all of the more substantial 
endnotes should have been incorporated into the body of the text. 
Moreover, Earman's definition of a miracle as a violation of the laws of 
nature overlooks an ambiguity in the term "violation" - between the sus-
pension of a law of nature and the falsification of a law of nature. 
Unfortunately, overlooking the former meaning forces him to treat the 
laws of nature as merely presumptive and this complicates his analysis of 
Hume's essay. Nevertheless, Earman's book should compel Hume enthu-
siasts to reconsider their enthusiasm concerning Hume's argument against 
miracles. Earman sets out a potent case for the claim that Hume's "Of 
Miracles" essay is largely derivative, marred by ambiguities, and entirely 
without merit in its probabilistic reasoning. 
God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature edited by Gregory E. Ganssle and 
David M. Woodruff. Oxford University Press, 2002, Pp. 252. $49.95 
J.R. LUCAS, F.B.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. 
After the aridities of Logical Positivism there has been an outburst of philos-
ophizing about traditional metaphysical topics. Philosophers, acknowledg-
ing the inability of their intellects to comprehend, but knowing, with St 
Augustine, that to stay silent would be even worse, dare to think about God 
and time. And in recent years much thought has been given to the relation 
